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Previous research suggested that husbands’ participation in housework is positively
associated with fertility choices for both women and men. We tested this association by
using data of four East Asian countries.
OBJECTIVE
This paper examines whether the positive association between gender-equal sharing of
housework participation and fertility intention in China, Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan has strengthened between 2006 and 2012.
METHODS
We harmonize two datasets, the 2006 East Asian Social Survey and the 2012
International Social Survey Programme. We employ OLS and ordered logit models
estimators to test the association between husband’s housework participation and the
ideal number of children.
RESULTS
In both 2006 and 2012, husband’s participation in housework is associated with both
own and partner’s fertility intentions in 2006 and 2012. The association between the
domestic division of labour and fertility has not changed between 2006 and 2012.
CONCLUSIONS
Corroborating the findings of our earlier paper the results suggest that a more gender-
equal domestic division of labour in East Asia is associated with higher fertility
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intentions in this region. The gender revolution framework offers a plausible
explanation for the East Asian fertility trends between 2006 and 2012. The findings
suggest that there is a stall in the pace of the gender revolution.
CONTRIBUTION
This paper provides a summary of the trends highlighted by the contributors to this
special issue. This is also the first paper to look at the evolution of domestic division of
labour and fertility preferences in four East Asian countries over time.
1. Special issue overview
This special issue is comprised of five papers focused on family trends and domestic
division of labour in four East Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
In a comparative paper analysing the association between fertility and domestic work
participation, Kan and Hertog (2017) find that in 2006, the domestic division of labour
has been very unequal in all four countries. Men did barely any domestic work in these
countries, and their fertility intentions were not associated much with their domestic
work participation. The situation was very different for women; Kan and Hertog (2017)
find that in East Asia, wives whose husbands participated more in housework were
willing to have more children. Subsequent papers in the special issue focus on one
country each and provide more detailed insights into men’s and women’s fertility
intentions and the consequences associated with having more children in Japan, China,
and South Korea.
Kim (2017) looks at fertility trends and the availability of formal and informal help
with domestic work in South Korea. According to her analysis, husbands’ help with
domestic work and access to inexpensive formal childcare are associated with a higher
likelihood of intended births. Echoing Kim’s (2017) and Kan and Hertog’s (2017)
results, Yang (2017) finds that in China, the level of a wife’s domestic work is
negatively associated with a desire to have another child. This association disappears,
however, when the sex of the child is taken into account. The cultural imperative to
have at least one son remains strong and mediates the association between the domestic
division of labour and fertility preferences in China. Nagase and Brinton (2017)
demonstrate that the husband’s share of domestic work is positively associated with
transitioning to a second birth in Japan. This association is especially strong in dual-
earner couples. They also find that highly educated men working for large Japanese
companies spend especially little time on unpaid work at home, whereas the trend in
Western countries is the opposite (Kolpashnikova 2018). They conclude that dual-
earner couples will find it difficult to have more than one child unless there is a change
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in the current legal and normative environment in Japan. Taking a somewhat different
tack, Mu and Xie (2016) look at the gendered consequences of having children in
China. They find that having additional children translates into greater career
confidence for men and into better subjective well-being for women.
To summarise, the special issue confirms the link between more gender-equal
division of labour in East Asia and fertility using a variety of data sources. This link is
consistent with the second stage of the gender revolution framework. This concluding
paper of the special issue builds on this finding and analyses whether the dynamics of
the association between fertility and domestic division of labour change over time.
Previous research suggests that the link between housework participation and fertility
did not remain static over time. Goldscheider et al. (2015) argue that in the early years
of the gender revolution, women were satisfied with juggling paid and unpaid work
because many women remained underemployed at least until their children started
school and often until secondary school. Over time, however, as a society experiences
gender revolution and women achieve greater equality in the labour market, the total
burden of paid and unpaid work becomes stressful. As women’s participation in the
labour market increases, it becomes harder for them to balance paid work with domestic
responsibilities on their own, and this gives rise to a positive association between more
gender-equal division of labour at home and fertility (e.g., Zhou 2017). Finally, Okun
and Raz-Yurovich (2019) argue that in countries that achieve significant levels of men’s
participation in housework, women’s greater desire to have more children may be
partially offset by men, who experience role incongruity and are more ambiguous about
having additional children.
This paper has two main goals: (a) to examine whether there is a positive
association between domestic division of labour and fertility in East Asia in 2012, as
well as in 2006 as recoded by Kan and Hertog (2017), and (b) to test if this association
has changed over time in China, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan in order to assess the
progress of gender revolution in East Asia.
2. Theoretical perspectives on the link between gender division of
labour at home and fertility over time
Fertility turnaround is a well-documented trend that links female labour force
participation to higher fertility on both macro and micro levels (e.g., Goldscheider,
Bernhardt, and Branden 2013; Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009; Zhou and Kan
2019). This trend has been largely explained through women’s changing status at home,
which follows their stronger attachment to the labour market. Feyer, Sacerdote, and
Stern (2008) posit three distinct stages in this process, characterised by different levels
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of men’s involvement in domestic work. The first stage is an equilibrium in which
women focus on home production and men specialise on paid work. In the second
stage, women start participating in paid work and continue to take responsibility for
home production. In this stage, working women reduce their fertility to manage their
increased workload. Finally, in the third stage, men start contributing to home
production and couples with more gender-equal division of labour at home are willing
to have more children. Feyer et al. (2008) argue that in the first two stages, husbands’
participation in home production is so low that the variation between couples is not
expected to make a difference for couples’ fertility preferences. They also argue that the
association between men’s housework share and fertility manifests itself once a society
reached the third stage, where husbands’ participation at home reaches a level high
enough to reduce women’s disincentives to have additional children. Feyer et al.’s
(2008) proposed stages of development in gender division of labour and fertility are
similar to Goldscheider et al.’s (2015) gender revolution framework. In particular, the
third (final) stage identified by Feyer et al. (2008) matches the second stage of the
gender revolution framework proposed by Goldscheider et al. (2015).
While we agree with Feyer et al. (2008) that the association between domestic
division of labour and fertility are likely to change over time, we consider that the
association will first increase and then decrease over time. At the initial stage, there is
an equilibrium between the gender division of labour and fertility, and therefore fertility
level is high. At this stage, the traditional gender-specialised division of labour is the
most common practice among couples. When societies progress to a second stage,
women increase their labour force participation while still responsible for the major
share of domestic work; they experience severe work–life conflicts, and fertility
declines. However, at this stage, traditional men and traditional women lag behind their
more gender-egalitarian counterparts in the domestic division of labour, so the
variations among women and among men in domestic division of labour will increase.
The association between domestic labour participation and fertility will, therefore,
increase in this transitional period. At the final stage (described as the third stage in
Feyer et al.’s framework and the second stage in Goldscheider et al.’s framework), we
expect that men will increase their participation in domestic work and the gender
division of labour in couples will reach equilibrium with fertility again eventually. At
the final stage, traditional men and traditional women will catch up with their more
egalitarian counterparts in the domestic division of labour, and therefore the variations
among men and among women will decrease. Fertility will rise. The association
between domestic work and fertility will also decrease or become insignificant when
equilibrium is about to be reached or has been reached.
We expect the relationship between the husband’s domestic work participation and
couple’s fertility to strengthen between 2006 and 2012 in the four East Asian countries,
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as this period is characterised by increasing work-family conflict for women, as more
women join the labour market and men’s participation in domestic work remains low.
That is, we expect that the East Asian countries are still at the transitional stage of the
gender revolution.
Research into the recent time use trends in European and Anglophone countries,
including the very low fertility ones, suggests that men’s participation in domestic work
is associated with more children in the family (Sullivan, Billari, and Altintas 2014).
This volume confirms that this is the case for four East Asian countries as well. This
paper will analyse if the positive association between gender equality at home and
fertility observed in 2006 in East Asia has grown stronger over time and will assess the
stage of development of the gender revolution in the region.
3. Domestic work in East Asia and the link to fertility
As detailed in Kan and Hertog (2017), even though China, Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan had unique historical and cultural trajectories (think of the one-child policy in
China), they also share many commonalities. Women in all four countries have
experienced a rise in conflict between their domestic and labour market roles in the past
few decades. In Japan, China, and South Korea, women’s labour force participation has
risen substantially (ILO; Yu 2015), while in China, the state rolled back public
childcare provision, making childcare less accessible for poorer families (Qi and
Melhuish 2017). At the same time, there has been little change in men’s domestic work
participation (e.g., Hertog and Kan 2019; Kolpashnikova 2019), potentially reflecting
the patriarchal Confucian family values shared by the four countries (for a more
detailed review of the context in the four countries, see Qian and Sayer 2016). The
persistent work–family conflict is reflected by a steep fall in female labour force
participation associated with childbearing in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, and by
an overall drop in women’s labour market participation in China (Hare 2016; Yu 2015).
The very low fertility in East Asia has attracted the attention of many researchers (Chen
and Li 2014; Frejka, Jones, and Sardon 2010; Raymo et al. 2015; Sechiyama 2013).
Frejka, Jones, and Sardon (2010) present an exhaustive study of childbearing trends in
East Asia (except China) since the 1950s. They emphasize the role of the expansion of
education in the precipitous decline of fertility rates. Raymo and colleagues (2015)
ascribe the low fertility in East Asian countries to the rapid social and economic
changes, which transpired without the commensurate changes in family attitudes. Chen
and Li (2014) emphasize that the role governments had on fertility rates was not
uniform; it exerted and continues to exert a higher influence in China than in other
counties of East Asia. Over the course of history, the differences in governmental
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intervention formed diverging patterns within the region (see Estevez-Abe and Naldini
2016 for a comparison of Japan and South Korea).
In addition, Suzuki (2013) argues that declining fertility in East Asia is the result
of endemic gender inequality and the Confucian family ideals in East Asian societies.
Similarly, McDonald (2009) suggests that gender inequality in East Asian societies
exacerbates work–family conflict, and the lack of economic security among women
results in the low fertility rates in the region. The link between fertility and gender
equality at home and how the association between the two changes over time remains
underexplored outside this special issue.
4. Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical ideas of the gender revolution framework outlined above, we
propose to test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Husbands and wives in couples where men contribute more to
housework show higher fertility intentions, and this association is observed in
2006 and 2012.
Hypothesis 2: We expect to find that the positive association between more equal
gender division of labour at home and fertility intentions has become stronger in
2012 compared to 2006.
Support for these hypotheses would confirm that the gender revolution is well
underway in the East Asian context. It would also suggest that, as the second stage of
the gender revolution intensifies, the low fertility East Asian countries should reap the
benefits of the positive effects of gender egalitarianism on fertility intentions, and we
should observe a reversal in fertility trends.
5. Methods
Data for the main analysis is represented by a harmonized dataset based on the 2006
East Asian Social Survey (EASS) and the 2012 International Social Survey Program
(ISSP) (Kim et al. 2014; ISSP Research Group 2016). We restricted our sample to four
East Asian countries: China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The harmonized sample
for the present study is comprised of married couples where women were over 20 and
under 45 years of age (N = 6,410: China n = 3,635, Japan n = 736, Korea n = 928,
Taiwan n = 1,111). We restricted the sample to married people because we wanted to
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analyse the housework participation for both spouses. Housework participation within
married couples is notably different from single and divorced women and men
(Kolpashnikova, Kan, and Shirakawa, 2019a; Kolpashnikova, Kan, and Shirakawa,
2019b). We use the original survey weights for the datasets.
5.1 Main variables
5.1.1 Fertility preference
In ISSP and EASS, there is no direct measure of fertility preference. We instead use the
respondents’ general perception of the ideal number of children to measure fertility
intentions and preferences, replicating the analysis in Kan and Hertog (2017).
5.1.2 Housework participation
In the original paper (Kan and Hertog 2017), we used the frequency of undertaking
three household chores as the measure for housework participation: meal preparation,
doing the laundry, and domestic cleaning. We recoded response options into four
categories and allocated scores between 1 (less than once a week) to 4 (every day). We
then constructed a scale of housework participation (ranging from 3 to 12), measured by
the sum of the frequency in undertaking the three household chores. In the ISSP data,
housework participation is represented by the self-reported measures of own and
spousal housework hours per week.
To make these two measures from EASS and ISPP comparable, we transformed
them into categorical measures of housework participation. We define three levels of
housework participation for men and for women respectively, since housework
participation varies heavily by gender. Category 1 of housework participation
represents the lowest 33% of housework participation within a gender group, category 2
represents the average participation in housework (34–66th percentiles), and category 3
represents the upper 33% of housework participation. Because the original EASS and
ISSP variables could not always be clearly cut by 33.3% for each category, we took the
closest percentile to match.
Other control variables include employment status, educational attainment of the
respondent and the spouse, household income quartiles, age of the respondent, number
of children, and country and year fixed effects. Among these, the educational
attainment variables had to be harmonized between the 2006 and 2012 data. In the
EASS paper, we used three categories of educational attainment: (1) primary education
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or lower, (2) junior high to secondary education, and (3) postsecondary. In the ISSP
data for Japan, there were no observations within the age range and among married
individuals who had only primary education or lower; therefore, we recoded both EASS
and ISSP educational attainment variable to include two categories: (1) secondary or
lower and (2) postsecondary.
6. Analysis outline
To test hypotheses, we will test the association of housework participation with the
ideal number of children using OLS estimation, controlling for the current number of
children and adding country and period interactions in subsequent models. We regress
women’s and men’s ideal number of children in separate models. We will test the
robustness of our findings in OLS models with ordered logit models. The robustness
checks on OLS models were also run by using negative binomial regressions, which are
more common when the dependent variables represent count numbers. However,
because the results are indistinguishable from those reported by OLS and ordered logit





Tables 1 and 2 summarize respondents’ and spousal housework contribution by average
frequency (2006 data) and hours (2012 data) in the three new harmonized categories, or
terciles, of housework participation. The tables show that Japanese men are involved in
housework the least among all men, both measured as the average frequency in 2006
and as housework hours in 2012. They self-report to contribute about four hours of their
time to housework tasks in 2012, whereas their spouses report them to spend about
three hours on an average week. Chinese men, on the other hand, contribute to domestic
work more frequently compared to men from three other countries (Table 1). Measured
in hours, Chinese and Korean men spend a little over seven hours a week on housework
(see Table 2). Table 2 also confirms that Japanese women spend the most amount of
time on housework during an average week, followed by Korean women. Overall, the
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descriptive statistics confirm that Chinese and Taiwanese couples enjoy a more equal
division of housework than Japanese and Korean couples.
Table 1: Housework and spouse housework frequency for men and women by
terciles, 2006
Men 2006 Spouses of
men 2006
Women 2006 Spouses of
women 2006
Lower tercile 3.000 7.229 7.632 3.000
(0.000) (2.036) (1.778) (0.000)
2nd tercile 5.709 10.495 10.552 4.895
(1.331) (0.501) (0.498) (0.801)
Upper tercile 10.135 12.000 12.000 9.128
(1.228) (0.000) (0.000) (1.846)
Total 5.748 10.014 10.607 5.228
(2.746) (2.345) (1.862) (2.699)
Total sample N 1439 1428 1737 1726
China 6.545 9.755 10.787 6.055
(2.983) (2.551) (1.773) (3.001)
N 653 652 820 814
Japan 4.186 10.696 10.968 3.948
(1.766) (1.555) (1.171) (1.790)
N 204 204 253 252
Korea 5.299 10.662 10.883 4.444
(2.436) (2.041) (1.673) (2.146)
N 271 269 360 358
Taiwan 5.489 9.538 9.493 4.997
(2.421) (2.362) (2.319) (2.296)
N 311 303 304 302
Table 2: Housework and spouse housework hours for men and women by
terciles, 2012
Men 2012 Spouses of
men 2012
Women 2012 Spouses of
women 2012
Lower tercile 0.792 6.256 6.238 0.834
(0.858) (2.947) (2.779) (0.803)
2nd tercile 6.345 17.754 17.256 5.300
(2.146) (3.680) (3.464) (1.581)
Upper tercile 18.558 37.724 36.534 15.990
(8.942) (12.222) (12.270) (10.485)
Total 7.013 18.959 18.014 6.227
(7.506) (13.720) (13.349) (7.874)
Total sample N 1587 1476 1624 1202
China 7.716 18.932 17.473 6.807
(7.594) (12.558) (12.240) (6.918)
N 1070 987 1085 727
Japan 4.176 26.000 24.808 3.343
(5.023) (18.808) (14.923) (3.835)
N 119 117 151 143
Korea 7.728 21.933 21.372 7.087
(9.382) (16.499) (16.213) (11.932)
N 125 119 172 150
Taiwan 5.165 14.407 13.306 5.467
(6.452) (12.101) (12.658) (9.032)
N 273 253 216 182
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Additionally, Tables 1 and 2 summarize housework participation by terciles. All
men in the lower tercile report doing housework once a week or less. That means that at
least 33% of all men barely ever participate in housework. Table 2 also shows that men
in the lowest tercile contribute less than an hour on an average week. Conversely, Table
1 shows that in the uppermost tercile all women report doing housework every day.
That is, at least 33% of all married women participate in housework daily. Table 2
shows that in this tercile, women spend about 37 hours every week – a number
comparable to a full working week.
In all four countries, women do the lion’s share of housework. The most gendered
pattern of domestic labour is observed in Japan, where women report doing almost all
housework and men report doing very little. These differences between countries echo
the results in Kan and Hertog (2017), and the reported differences between East Asian
countries in 2006 persisted through 2012.
7.1.2 The actual and ideal number of children
Table 3 shows that there is a gap between the mean of the actual number of children
and that of the ideal number of children. Same as the results for the EASS 2006, the gap
in the ISSP 2012 data is the highest in Japan and Korea (~0.9). On average, the ideal
number of children is higher for men than women. Overall, the number of children that
men and women want decreased significantly from 2006 to 2012 for the total sample
(t = 4.323, p < .001 for women, t = 4.119, p < .001 for men), and the actual number of
children decreased significantly as well (t = 15.017, p < .001 for women, t = 18.344,
p < .001 for men).
Table 3: Men’s and women’s actual and ideal number of children by country
China (sd) Japan (sd) South Korea (sd) Taiwan (sd)
Men
 Number of children (2006) 1.57 (0.72) 1.95 (0.74) 1.91 (0.65) 2.05 (0.75)
(2012) 0.99 (0.73) 1.55 (1.04) 1.44 (0.86) 1.56 (1.03)
 Ideal number of children (2006) 1.83 (0.63) 2.59 (0.63) 2.62 (0.90) 2.31 (0.74)
(2012) 1.79 (0.42) 2.53 (0.61) 2.55 (0.75) 2.37 (0.74)
Women
 Number of children (2006) 1.62 (0.79) 1.99 (0.73) 1.93 (0.58) 2.19 (0.86)
(2012) 1.10 (0.75) 1.55 (1.02) 1.61 (0.91) 1.84 (1.09)
 Ideal number of children (2006) 1.79 (0.54) 2.66 (0.66) 2.59 (0.88) 2.34 (0.72)
(2012) 1.80 (0.41) 2.64 (0.70) 2.43 (0.88) 2.24 (0.62)
Data Source: East Asian Social Surveys 2006 and International Social Survey Programme 2012.
Similar to results in Kan and Hertog (2017), Taiwanese and Chinese couples both
have and desire fewer children than couples in other countries. In China, this is likely to
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reflect the de facto one-child policy, which was still in effect between 2006 and 2012.
Taiwanese women have the lowest gap between the ideal and the real number of
children, but they also have the highest actual number of children among women in the
four countries. Thus, Taiwanese women’s low desire for more children may simply
reflect their success in fulfilling their fertility desires.
7.2 Multivariate analyses
Tables 4 and 6 present OLS regressions and Tables 5 and 7 present ordered logit
estimates that use the ideal number of children for men and women as the dependent
variable. The reference category for housework participation variables is the lowest
tercile. The models control for household income, age, both partners’ employment
statuses, and educational level. In all models, we used Taiwan as the reference country.
Our conclusions remain the same if another country is used as a reference category.
Table 4: OLS regression models of the ideal number of children, men
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
China –0.454*** –0.227** –0.127
(0.038) (0.085) (0.127)
Japan 0.266*** 0.466*** 0.463*
(0.050) (0.134) (0.216)
Korea 0.305*** 0.671*** 0.679**
(0.056) (0.150) (0.218)
2012 0.084** 0.207** 0.335**
(0.028) (0.063) (0.125)
Has a job 0.047 0.047 0.047
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049)
Spouse has a job 0.049+ 0.048 0.056+
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Children 0.196*** 0.193*** 0.193***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
25–50th HI percentile –0.024 –0.016 –0.017
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
50–75th HI percentile 0.012 0.012 0.012
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Upper HI quartile 0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Secondary or below –0.028 –0.029 –0.030
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Spouse: Secondary or below –0.002 –0.002 0.006
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
2nd tercile of housework 0.069* 0.144* 0.208*
(0.029) (0.064) (0.095)
Upper tercile of housework 0.061 0.206+ 0.316*
(0.039) (0.109) (0.149)
2nd tercile of spouse-housework 0.016 0.126+ 0.175
(0.032) (0.072) (0.116)
Upper tercile of spouse-housework 0.031 0.199* 0.249*
(0.036) (0.077) (0.105)
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Table 4: (Continue)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
China # 2012 –0.130+ –0.305*
(0.069) (0.151)
Japan # 2012 –0.211* –0.184
(0.099) (0.256)
Korea # 2012 –0.180+ –0.195
(0.109) (0.288)
2nd tercile of HW # China –0.112 –0.164
(0.073) (0.117)
2nd tercile of HW # Japan –0.045 –0.092
(0.105) (0.149)
2nd tercile of HW # Korea –0.077 –0.137
(0.119) (0.171)
Upper tercile of HW # China –0.166 –0.207
(0.117) (0.171)
Upper tercile of HW # Japan 0.005 –0.187
(0.221) (0.421)
Upper tercile of HW # Korea –0.304+ –0.494*
(0.174) (0.244)
2nd tercile of S HW # China –0.132+ –0.256+
(0.079) (0.135)
2nd tercile of S HW # Japan –0.072 0.007
(0.134) (0.230)
2nd tercile of S HW # Korea –0.261+ –0.258
(0.143) (0.212)
Upper tercile of S HW # China –0.176* –0.290*
(0.086) (0.127)
Upper tercile of S HW # Japan –0.192 –0.190
(0.138) (0.231)
Upper tercile of S HW # Korea –0.347* –0.279
(0.144) (0.203)
2nd tercile of HW # 2012 –0.122
(0.129)
Upper tercile of HW # 2012 –0.249
(0.230)
2nd tercile of HW # China # 2012 0.100
(0.151)
2nd tercile of HW # Japan # 2012 0.094
(0.207)
2nd tercile of HW # Korea # 2012 0.149
(0.245)
Upper tercile of HW # China # 2012 0.107
(0.250)
Upper tercile of HW # Japan # 2012 0.447
(0.482)
Upper tercile of HW # Korea # 2012 0.456
(0.356)
2nd tercile of S HW # 2012 –0.059
(0.147)
Upper tercile of S HW # 2012 –0.070
(0.163)
2nd tercile of S HW # China # 2012 0.193
(0.167)
2nd tercile of S HW # Japan # 2012 –0.256
(0.278)
2nd tercile of S HW # Korea # 2012 –0.051
(0.291)
Upper tercile of S HW # China # 2012 0.213
(0.182)
Upper tercile of S HW # Japan # 2012 –0.019
(0.294)
Upper tercile of S HW # Korea # 2012 –0.209
(0.302)
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Table 4: (Continue)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Constant 1.807*** 1.626*** 1.545***
(0.103) (0.120) (0.142)
Observations 2515 2515 2515
R2 0.300 0.307 0.312
Adjusted R2 0.295 0.298 0.298
HW – Housework, S HW – Spouse: Housework. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 5: Ordered logit models of the ideal number of children, men
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Ideal number of children
China –2.325*** –1.733*** –1.245*
(0.190) (0.369) (0.544)
Japan 0.865*** 1.521*** 1.452*
(0.158) (0.442) (0.729)
Korea 0.871*** 1.925*** 2.215***
(0.164) (0.446) (0.652)
2012 0.341*** 0.656** 1.211*
(0.100) (0.219) (0.476)
Has a job 0.079 0.095 0.098
(0.181) (0.180) (0.182)
Spouse has a job 0.202* 0.203* 0.235*
(0.100) (0.102) (0.104)
Age 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Children 0.750*** 0.747*** 0.755***
(0.064) (0.065) (0.065)
25–50th HI percentile –0.117 –0.097 –0.099
(0.126) (0.128) (0.128)
50–75th HI percentile 0.031 0.039 0.042
(0.133) (0.134) (0.136)
Upper HI quartile –0.013 –0.006 –0.001
(0.136) (0.137) (0.137)
Secondary or below –0.060 –0.060 –0.056
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118)
Spouse: Secondary or below –0.003 –0.000 0.022
(0.119) (0.120) (0.120)
2nd tercile of housework 0.262* 0.481* 0.738*
(0.104) (0.230) (0.346)
Upper tercile of housework 0.116 0.385 0.795+
(0.138) (0.341) (0.469)
2nd tercile of spouse-housework 0.117 0.405 0.638
(0.116) (0.247) (0.410)
Upper tercile of spouse-housework 0.100 0.648* 0.877*
(0.127) (0.268) (0.374)
China # 2012 –0.302 –1.109+
(0.258) (0.603)
Japan # 2012 –0.593+ –0.444
(0.319) (0.872)
Korea # 2012 –0.437 –0.918
(0.324) (0.842)
2nd tercile of HW # China –0.333 –0.562
(0.277) (0.467)
2nd tercile of HW # Japan –0.238 –0.515
(0.331) (0.465)
2nd tercile of HW # Korea –0.174 –0.413
(0.359) (0.534)
Upper tercile of HW # China –0.321 –0.548
(0.385) (0.580)
Upper tercile of HW # Japan 0.295 –0.114
(0.618) (1.315)
Kan, Hertog, & Kolpashnikova: Housework share and fertility preference
1034 http://www.demographic-research.org
Table 5: (Continue)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Upper tercile of HW # Korea –0.632 –1.318+
(0.533) (0.738)
2nd tercile of S HW # China –0.337 –0.848+
(0.286) (0.507)
2nd tercile of S HW # Japan –0.196 0.153
(0.434) (0.752)
2nd tercile of S HW # Korea –0.747+ –1.101+
(0.410) (0.620)
Upper tercile of S HW # China –0.498 –1.063*
(0.313) (0.485)
Upper tercile of S HW # Japan –0.692 –0.539
(0.448) (0.767)
Upper tercile of S HW # Korea –1.175** –1.192*
(0.414) (0.584)
2nd tercile of HW # 2012 –0.468
(0.467)
Upper tercile of HW # 2012 –0.870
(0.735)
2nd tercile of HW # China # 2012 0.400
(0.586)
2nd tercile of HW # Japan # 2012 0.552
(0.669)
2nd tercile of HW # Korea # 2012 0.519
(0.734)
Upper tercile of HW # China # 2012 0.460
(0.835)
Upper tercile of HW # Japan # 2012 1.097
(1.493)
Upper tercile of HW # Korea # 2012 1.509
(1.091)
2nd tercile of S HW # 2012 –0.300
(0.514)
Upper tercile of S HW # 2012 –0.334
(0.570)
2nd tercile of S HW # China # 2012 0.787
(0.618)
2nd tercile of S HW # Japan # 2012 –0.945
(0.925)
2nd tercile of S HW # Korea # 2012 0.490
(0.833)
Upper tercile of S HW # China # 2012 1.017
(0.672)
Upper tercile of S HW # Japan # 2012 –0.295
(0.981)
Upper tercile of S HW # Korea # 2012 –0.230
(0.870)
Constant cut1 –5.482*** –4.943*** –4.577***
(0.494) (0.563) (0.641)
Constant cut2 –2.007*** –1.470** –1.097*
(0.410) (0.472) (0.554)
Constant cut3 2.685*** 3.234*** 3.625***
(0.387) (0.447) (0.534)
Constant cut4 5.194*** 5.770*** 6.176***
(0.408) (0.467) (0.552)
Constant cut5 6.541*** 7.120*** 7.527***
(0.451) (0.505) (0.584)
Constant cut6 9.489*** 10.067*** 10.474***
(1.077) (1.099) (1.139)
Observations 2515 2515 2515
Chi square 621.095 678.729 702.909
d.f. 17 32 48
Pseudo R2 0.201 0.205 0.208
HW – Housework, S HW – Spouse: Housework. Standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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After controlling for the current number of children, age, household income, the
employment statuses of both partners, and other control factors, we find that men and
women in Japan and Korea want more children than couples in Taiwan. Conversely,
Chinese men and women prefer fewer children than their Taiwanese counterparts. It is
important to remember that the one-child policy was not yet relaxed in 2012 in China,
which is reflected in the present results.
Our main theoretical interest is in the association between husbands’ housework
participation and fertility intentions. First, we find support for Hypothesis 1. In the
combined EASS and ISSP data sample, we find that men’s involvement in housework
is positively associated with fertility intentions. Model 1 in Table 4 shows that men who
get more involved in housework (second tercile over the lower tercile) have on average
a higher ideal number of children than men in the lower tercile of housework
participation. The same results are evident in the ordered logit models (see Table 5).
When interactions with countries are added in Model 2, we find that higher
participation levels in housework among men, both in the second and upper terciles, is
significantly associated with higher fertility intentions. There is only one exception: the
upper tercile of Korean men. For them, being in the upper tercile is negatively
associated with fertility intentions, and the association is on the statistically significant
level (see Model 2 in Table 4). This suggests that men’s participation in housework is
significantly associated with increased fertility rates in all countries of East Asia, except
among higher housework performers in Korea.4
Table 6: OLS regression models of the ideal number of children, women
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
China –0.432*** –0.414*** –0.514***
(0.041) (0.090) (0.120)
Japan 0.365*** 0.472*** 0.490**
(0.052) (0.128) (0.186)
Korea 0.277*** 0.404** 0.484***
(0.055) (0.125) (0.147)
2012 0.040 –0.051 –0.117
(0.029) (0.066) (0.147)
Has a job 0.058+ 0.066* 0.061+
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
4 In Tables 4 and 5, we can see that the upper tercile of housework participation is positive but marginally
insignificant in Model 1 (no interactions), but turns out to be significant in Models 2 and 3 (including
interactions). This is because men’s housework participation is not significantly associated with their own
desired number of children in Korea, and including Korean men and women in the baseline models has
weakened the overall association. Comparing Model 1 with Models 2 and 3 of women’s desired number of
children in Tables 6 and 7, when interactions between country and spouse’s housework participation are
included in Models 2 and 3, we can see that the size of coefficients for Japan and Korea increases
substantively and the interaction between the second tercile of spouse’s housework participation becomes
significant and negative for Japan and Korea. Accordingly, the coefficient of the second tercile of housework
participation becomes insignificant in Models 2 and 3. We should note that some of the observed associations
are only significant at 10% level and need to be interpreted with caution.
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Table 6: (Continue)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Spouse has a job 0.108* 0.066 0.075
(0.053) (0.055) (0.055)
Age 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Children 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.121***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
25–50th HI percentile –0.023 –0.025 –0.025
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
50–75th HI percentile –0.047 –0.052 –0.054
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Upper HI quartile 0.002 –0.002 –0.005
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Postsecondary 0.032 0.036 0.034
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Spouse: Postsecondary –0.031 –0.039 –0.032
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
2nd tercile of housework –0.023 0.098 0.114
(0.035) (0.073) (0.100)
Upper tercile of housework 0.037 0.012 –0.020
(0.038) (0.093) (0.114)
2nd tercile of spouse-housework 0.055+ 0.134+ 0.077
(0.032) (0.075) (0.099)
Upper tercile of spouse-housework 0.077* 0.125 0.135
(0.035) (0.091) (0.124)
China # 2012 0.149* 0.328+
(0.073) (0.170)
Japan # 2012 0.138 0.106
(0.104) (0.242)
Korea # 2012 –0.056 –0.247
(0.118) (0.232)
2nd tercile of HW # China –0.113 –0.066
(0.082) (0.130)
2nd tercile of HW # Japan –0.240+ –0.283
(0.135) (0.199)
2nd tercile of HW # Korea –0.231+ –0.408*
(0.137) (0.169)
Upper tercile of HW # China 0.040 0.134
(0.100) (0.138)
Upper tercile of HW # Japan 0.007 0.013
(0.134) (0.203)
Upper tercile of HW # Korea –0.038 –0.066
(0.138) (0.172)
2nd tercile of S HW # China –0.115 –0.039
(0.084) (0.118)
2nd tercile of S HW # Japan –0.158 –0.243+
(0.111) (0.145)
2nd tercile of S HW # Korea –0.042 –0.101
(0.123) (0.145)
Upper tercile of S HW # China –0.067 –0.037
(0.098) (0.138)
Upper tercile of S HW # Japan –0.165 –0.033
(0.164) (0.227)
Upper tercile of S HW # Korea 0.021 0.086
(0.150) (0.207)
2nd tercile of HW # 2012 –0.028
(0.145)
Upper tercile of HW # 2012 0.142
(0.177)
2nd tercile of HW # China # 2012 –0.061
(0.171)
2nd tercile of HW # Japan # 2012 0.070
(0.278)
2nd tercile of HW # Korea # 2012 0.400
(0.278)
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Table 6: (Continue)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Upper tercile of HW # China # 2012 –0.244
(0.198)
Upper tercile of HW # Japan # 2012 –0.090
(0.274)
Upper tercile of HW # Korea # 2012 –0.056
(0.284)
2nd tercile of S HW # 2012 0.146
(0.152)
Upper tercile of S HW # 2012 –0.054
(0.168)
2nd tercile of S HW # China # 2012 –0.183
(0.171)
2nd tercile of S HW # Japan # 2012 0.151
(0.224)
2nd tercile of S HW # Korea # 2012 0.247
(0.271)
Upper tercile of S HW # China # 2012 –0.032
(0.184)
Upper tercile of S HW # Japan # 2012 –0.268
(0.313)
Upper tercile of S HW # Korea # 2012 –0.038
(0.291)
Constant 1.540*** 1.551*** 1.579***
(0.107) (0.125) (0.136)
Observations 2539 2539 2539
R2 0.266 0.272 0.280
Adjusted R2 0.261 0.263 0.266
HW – Housework, S HW – Spouse: Housework. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 7: Ordered logit models of the ideal number of children, women
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Ideal number of children
China –1.961*** –2.055*** –2.591***
(0.168) (0.341) (0.457)
Japan 1.164*** 1.597*** 1.514**
(0.151) (0.374) (0.549)
Korea 0.834*** 1.439*** 1.348**
(0.167) (0.370) (0.417)
2012 0.160 –0.261 –0.820+
(0.100) (0.210) (0.425)
Has a job 0.211* 0.241* 0.236*
(0.107) (0.109) (0.110)
Spouse has a job 0.340* 0.211 0.230
(0.172) (0.185) (0.187)
Age 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Children 0.477*** 0.491*** 0.486***
(0.063) (0.064) (0.064)
25–50th HI percentile –0.117 –0.130 –0.130
(0.126) (0.127) (0.127)
50–75th HI percentile –0.229+ –0.243+ –0.249+
(0.135) (0.135) (0.136)
Upper HI Quartile 0.022 0.008 –0.001
(0.138) (0.139) (0.140)
Secondary or below 0.108 0.126 0.120
(0.119) (0.120) (0.120)
Spouse: Secondary or below –0.094 –0.113 –0.103
(0.116) (0.116) (0.117)
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Table 7: (Continue)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
2nd tercile of housework –0.107 0.372 0.357
(0.121) (0.233) (0.311)
Upper tercile of housework 0.106 0.083 –0.084
(0.132) (0.289) (0.348)
2nd tercile of spouse-housework 0.166 0.413+ 0.102
(0.105) (0.230) (0.301)
Upper tercile of spouse-housework 0.274* 0.424 0.324
(0.123) (0.286) (0.375)
China # 2012 0.705** 1.747**
(0.252) (0.558)
Japan # 2012 0.493+ 0.799
(0.293) (0.689)
Korea # 2012 –0.088 0.019
(0.352) (0.706)
2nd tercile of HW # China –0.383 –0.100
(0.282) (0.463)
2nd tercile of HW # Japan –0.857* –0.883
(0.383) (0.582)
2nd tercile of HW # Korea –1.098** –1.260*
(0.405) (0.493)
Upper tercile of HW # China 0.180 0.610
(0.336) (0.473)
Upper tercile of HW # Japan –0.144 –0.042
(0.383) (0.585)
Upper tercile of HW # Korea –0.376 –0.195
(0.401) (0.481)
2nd tercile of S HW # China –0.329 0.054
(0.279) (0.403)
2nd tercile of S HW # Japan –0.485 –0.586
(0.316) (0.433)
2nd tercile of S HW # Korea –0.151 –0.177
(0.362) (0.447)
Upper tercile of S HW # China –0.164 0.104
(0.333) (0.458)
Upper tercile of S HW # Japan –0.560 –0.157
(0.456) (0.580)
Upper tercile of S HW # Korea 0.047 0.335
(0.425) (0.533)
2nd tercile of HW # 2012 0.081
(0.448)
Upper tercile of HW # 2012 0.675
(0.563)
2nd tercile of HW # China # 2012 –0.475
(0.590)
2nd tercile of HW # Japan # 2012 –0.069
(0.790)
2nd tercile of HW # Korea # 2012 0.515
(0.833)
Upper tercile of HW # China # 2012 –1.106
(0.681)
Upper tercile of HW # Japan # 2012 –0.553
(0.800)
Upper tercile of HW # Korea # 2012 –0.715
(0.863)
2nd tercile of S HW # 2012 0.863+
(0.456)
Upper tercile of S HW # 2012 0.198
(0.550)
2nd tercile of S HW # China # 2012 –1.008+
(0.560)
2nd tercile of S HW # Japan # 2012 –0.021
(0.628)
2nd tercile of S HW # Korea # 2012 0.293
(0.780)
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Table 7: (Continue)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Upper tercile of S HW # China # 2012 –0.557
(0.638)
Upper tercile of S HW # Japan # 2012 –0.939
(0.914)
Upper tercile of S HW # Korea # 2012 –0.438
(0.877)
Constant cut1 –4.720*** –4.761*** –5.019***
(0.520) (0.581) (0.601)
Constant cut2 –0.815* –0.848+ –1.098*
(0.406) (0.456) (0.484)
Constant cut3 3.576*** 3.571*** 3.340***
(0.403) (0.448) (0.473)
Constant cut4 5.624*** 5.646*** 5.437***
(0.410) (0.459) (0.482)
Constant cut5 7.622*** 7.653*** 7.449***
(0.474) (0.518) (0.529)
Constant cut6 9.272*** 9.303*** 9.101***
(0.719) (0.751) (0.746)
Observations 2539 2539 2539
Chi square 553.732 584.948 612.052
d.f. 17 32 48
Pseudo R2 0.169 0.174 0.179
HW – Housework, S HW – Spouse: Housework. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Hypotheses 1 is supported for women as well as for men. When husbands are more
involved in housework, women are more likely to have a higher ideal number of
children compared to women whose husbands are not involved much in housework (the
lowest tercile). The previous research (Kan and Hertog 2017) came to the same
conclusion, and it is in line with the expectation of the gender revolution framework
that husbands’ domestic involvement improves fertility intentions. We also find that
this assertion applies to women in all East Asian countries (the interactions between
countries and spousal housework participation were not on significant level – see Model
2 in Table 6).
Model 3 in Tables 4 and 5 tests if there are changes in the associations between
interactions of housework and country categories for the two periods. All interactions
for the recent time period are not on significant level, which suggests that the
associations revealed in 2006 persisted, rather than strengthened, in 2012 and our
Hypotheses 2 is not supported. However, the net effect of the year remains significant
in all models, but only among men. The ideal number of children among men, despite
what was suggested by the descriptive statistics, has increased over time when we
control for all other variables, especially for the actual number of children. This means
that given the actual number of children, men in 2012 are more likely to want more
children than they were in 2006.
These findings overall confirm the results of the papers in this special issue.
Furthermore, we find that that there has been no change in the strength of the
association between housework and fertility intention between 2006 and 2012. This
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finding implies that the gender revolution in the four East Asian countries has been
stalled rather than progressing.
8. Discussion and conclusion
This paper offers fresh evidence that the gender revolution in East Asia, manifested in
the association between housework participation and fertility, is stalled. Husbands who
participate more in housework prefer to have more children (with the exception of
South Korea). It is conceivable that even a small increase in domestic work
participation leads men to appreciate their families more and wish to have more
children. Also overall, women’s ideal number of children is higher when their husbands
participate in housework more. Therefore, men’s more egalitarian behaviours with
regard to domestic labour contribute not only to their own fertility intentions but also
positively influences their partners’ intentions to have more children. There is no
evidence that the association has strengthened between 2006 and 2012. So at least
during this period, the gender revolution in East Asia has not been gathering
momentum. As noted in previous research, this does not bode well for future fertility
trends in East Asia.
Furthermore, housework is shared extremely unequally in all the four East Asian
countries under investigation in 2006 and 2012 remaining largely women's job. The
findings are consistent with earlier studies on the domestic division of labour in East
Asia (e.g., Kan and He 2018; Kan and Hertog 2017). More recently, time-use research
on East Asia has shown that there has been a continuous convergence in gender division
of labour at home in Taiwan (Kolpashnikova 2019c) and Japan (Hertog and Kan 2019)
in the last two decades, but the pace of this convergence has been extremely slow. As
found in Kan and Hertog (2017), there are considerable differences across countries
within the region. Japanese women’s participation in housework exceeds that of women
in other four East Asian countries, whereas Japanese men still spend the least amount of
time on housework compared to men in other countries. China and Taiwan have
somewhat more equal gender division of labour at home than Japan and South Korea,
and in Taiwan, we observe the smallest gap between the actual and ideal number of
children in all the four countries in both 2006 and 2012. Chinese fertility trends reflect
the one-child policy, thus men and women there have and want fewer children than in
Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea.
One limitation of our findings is that we can only observe changes over six years.
Carrying out a similar analysis covering a longer period of time, perhaps when the next
Family and Changing Gender Roles module of the International Social Survey
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Programme becomes available, would be necessary to examine the progress of the
gender revolution.
Another limitation is that the relatively small sample size for each of the four East
Asian countries in our data does not allow us to test whether there is a significant
change in the association between housework and fertility over time in each country.
Future research may employ survey data with a large sample size in each of the
countries and test further the change in the association between housework and fertility
preference over time.
One more crucial avenue for future research is to analyse the regional trends in
domestic division of labour over time using more explicitly comparable data in a way
similar to what has been done for European and Anglophone data (e.g., Kan, Sullivan,
and Gershuny 2011; Sullivan, Gershuny, and Robinson 2018). These trends are likely to
offer more precise insights into the trajectory of the gender revolution in East Asia and,
by extension, bring new insights into how fertility rates in the region will perform in the
future.
9. Acknowledgement
This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (principal
investigator: Man-Yee Kan, grant number 771736) and the University of Oxford John
Fell Fund (awardees: Man-Yee Kan and Ekaterina Hertog).
Kan, Hertog, & Kolpashnikova: Housework share and fertility preference
1042 http://www.demographic-research.org
References
Chen, Y.C.C. and Li, J.C.A. (2014). Family change in East Asia. In: Treas, J., Scott,
J.L., and Richards, M. (eds.). The Wiley-Blackwell companion to the sociology
of families. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell: 61–82. doi:10.1002–/97811183740
85.ch4.
Estevez-Abe, M. and Naldini, M. (2016). Politics of defamilialization: A comparison of
Italy, Japan, Korea and Spain. Journal of European Social Policy 26(4): 327–
343. doi:10.1177/0958928716657276.
Feyrer, J., Sacerdote, B., and Stern, A.D. (2008). Will the stork return to Europe and
Japan? Understanding fertility within developed nations. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 22(3): 3–22. doi:10.1257/jep.22.3.3.
Frejka, T., Jones, G.W., and Sardon, J.P. (2010). East Asian childbearing patterns and
policy developments. Population and Development Review 36(3): 579–606.
doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2010.00347.x.
Goldscheider, F., Bernhardt, E., and Lappegård, T. (2015). The gender revolution: A
framework for understanding changing family and demographic behavior.
Population and Development Review 41(2): 207–239. doi:10.1111/j.1728-
4457.2015.00045.x.
Goldscheider, F., Bernhardt, E., & Branden, M. (2013). Domestic gender equality and
childbearing in Sweden. Demographic Research 29(40): 1097–1126. doi:10.40
54/DemRes.2013.29.40.
Hare, D. (2016). What accounts for the decline in labor force participation among
married women in urban China, 1991–2011? China Economic Review 38: 251–
266. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00045.x.
Hertog, E. and Kan, M. Y. (2019). Education and gendered division of domestic labor
over time in contemporary Japan. Paper presented at the Population Association
of America, Austin, Texas, April 10–13, 2019.
International Labour Organisation (various years) ILOSTAT database. Geneva:
International Labour Organisation. https://ilostat.ilo.org/.
ISSP Research Group (2016). International Social Survey Programme: Family and
Changing Gender Roles IV - ISSP 2012. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne.
ZA5900 Data file Version 4.0.0. doi:10.4232/1.12661.
Demographic Research: Volume 41, Article 35
http://www.demographic-research.org 1043
Kan, M.-Y. and He, G. (2018). Resource bargaining and gender display in housework
and care work in modern China. Chinese Sociological Review 50(2): 188–230.
doi:10.1080/21620555.2018.1430506.
Kan, M.-Y., Sullivan, O., and Gershuny, J. (2011). Gender convergence in domestic
work: Discerning the effects of interactional and institutional barriers from large-
scale data. Sociology 45(2): 234–251. doi:10.1177/0038038510394014.
Kan, M.-Y. and Hertog, E. (2017). Domestic division of labour and fertility preference
in China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Demographic Research 36(18): 557–
587. doi:10.4054/DemRes.2017.36.18.
Kim, E.H.W. (2017). Division of domestic labour and lowest-low fertility in South
Korea. Demographic Research 37(24): 743–768. doi:10.4054/DemRes.2017.
37.24.
Kim, S.-W., Chang, Y.-H., Iwai, N., and Li, L. (2014). East Asian Social Survey
(EASS), Cross-National Survey S Sets: Families in East Asia, 2006. Ann Arbor:
EASSDA, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.
(ICPSR 34606) doi:10.3886/ICPSR34606.v3
Kolpashnikova, K. (2018). American househusbands: New time use evidence of gender
display, 2003–2016. Social Indicators Research 140(3): 1259–1277. doi:10.10
07/s11205-017-1813-z.
Kolpashnikova, K., Kan, M.-Y., and Shirakawa, K. (2019a). Marriage and housework:
Analyzing the effects of education using the 2011 and 2016 Japanese survey on
time use and leisure activities. (IER Discussion Paper 696). doi:10.312
35/osf.io/9shup.
Kolpashnikova, K., Kan, M.-Y., and Shirakawa, K. (2019b). Marriage penalty:
Unconditional quantile regression of housework participation in Japan. (IER
Discussion Paper 695). doi:10.31219/osf.io/5qdwy.
Kolpashnikova, K. (2019c). Taiwan: Paid and unpaid work trends. Retrieved from
https://blogs.ubc.ca/kamilakolpashnikova/taiwan-paid-and-unpaid-work-trends/
McDonald, P. (2009). Explanations of low fertility in East Asia: A comparative
perspective. In: Jones, G.W., Straughan, P.T., and Chan, A.W.M. (eds.). Ultra-
low fertility in Pacific Asia: Trends, causes and policy issues. New York:
Routledge: 23– 39.
Myrskyla, M., Kohler, H.P., and Billari, F.C. (2009). Advances in development reverse
fertility declines. Nature 460(7256): 741–743. doi:10.1038/nature08230.
Kan, Hertog, & Kolpashnikova: Housework share and fertility preference
1044 http://www.demographic-research.org
Mu, Z. and Xie, Y. (2016). ‘Motherhood penalty’ and ‘fatherhood premium’? Fertility
effects on parents in China. Demographic Research 35(47): 1373–1410.
doi:10.4054/DemRes.2016.35.47.
Nagase, N. and Brinton, M.C. (2017). The gender division of labor and second births:
Labor market institutions and fertility in Japan. Demographic Research 36(11):
339–370. doi:10.4054/DemRes.2017.36.11.
Okun, B.S. and Raz-Yurovich, L. (2019). Housework, gender role attitudes, and
couples’ fertility intentions: Reconsidering men’s roles in gender theories of
family change. Population and Development Review 45(1): 169–196. doi:10.11
11/padr.12207.
Qi, X.F. and Melhuish, E.C. (2017). Early childhood education and care in China:
History, current trends and challenges. Early Years 37(3): 268–284.
doi:10.1080/09575146.2016.1236780.
Qian, Y. and Sayer, L.C. (2016). Division of labor, gender ideology, and marital
satisfaction in East Asia. Journal of Marriage and Family 78(2): 383–400.
doi:10.1111/jomf.12274.
Raymo, J.M., Park, H., Xie, Y., and Yeung, W-j.J. (2015). Marriage and family in East
Asia: Continuity and change. In: Cook, K.S. and Massey, D.S. (eds.). Annual
Review of Sociology 41: 471–492. doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-073014-112428.
Sechiyama, K. (2013). Patriarchy in East Asia: A comparative sociology of gender.
Leiden: BRILL. doi:10.1163/9789004247772.
Sullivan, O., Billari, F.C., and Altintas, E. (2014). Fathers’ changing contributions to
child care and domestic work in very low-fertility countries: The effect of
education. Journal of Family Issues 35(8): 1048–1065. doi:10.1146/annurev-soc
-073014-112428.
Sullivan, O., Gershuny, J., and Robinson, J.P. (2018). Stalled or uneven gender
revolution? A long-term processual framework for understanding why change is
slow. Journal of Family Theory and Review 10(1): 263–279. doi:10.1111/
jftr.12248.
Suzuki, T. (2013). Low fertility and population aging in Japan and Eastern Asia.
Berlin: Springer. doi:10.1111/jftr.12248.
Yang, J.H. (2017). Gendered division of domestic work and willingness to have more
children in China. Demographic Research 37(62): 1949–1974. doi:10.4054/
DemRes.2017.37.62.
Demographic Research: Volume 41, Article 35
http://www.demographic-research.org 1045
Yu, W.-H. (2015). Women and employment in Taiwan. https://www.brookings.edu/
opinions/women-and-employment-in-taiwan/.
Zhou, M. (2017). Motherhood, employment, and the dynamics of women’s gender
attitudes. Gender and Society 31(6): 751–776. doi:10.1177/0891243217732320.
Zhou, M. and Kan, M-Y. (2019). A new family equilibrium? Changing dynamics
between the gender division of labor and fertility in Great Britain, 1991–2017.
Demographic Research 40(50): 1455–1500. doi:10.4054/DemRes.2019.40.50.
Kan, Hertog, & Kolpashnikova: Housework share and fertility preference
1046 http://www.demographic-research.org
